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The Right of Soviet Jews
to Emigrate
by Richard L. Flax

At the beginning of the sixteenth century, Anti-Jewish policy of the Muscovy
Tsardom in Russia was expressed by having Jews burnt at the stake for heresy. In
1976, Aleksandr Lunts, a Soviet Jew, felt
compelled to leave the Soviet Union due
to the oppressive nature of Anti-Semitism
in his homeland. Thus, from Tsarist
Russia to the present Communist regime,
the plight of the Russian Jew has been
marred by institutionalized religious persecution. Fortunately, the technological
advances of the twentieth century have
created a "shrinking world" in which every nation-state is put under microscopic
global inspection. The results of these international microscopic inspections have
taken varied routes, such as war, apathy,
alienation and interntional accord. International law has been the primary catalyst
in the evolution of peaceful results. To
analyze the problems of the Soviet Jews it
will be necessary to scrutinize the dictates
of international law, and more important,
in order to aid the Soviet Jews who suffer
from persecution, resort must be had to
international law and world opinion.
The central thrust of this article will
concentrate on the emigration of Jews
from the Soviet Union. The total Jewish
population of the Soviet Union is approximately 2,000,000 people. As indicated

by the chart below, approximately
119,359 Jews have emigrated from the
Soviet Union during the years
1969-1975.
The right to emigrate has been
proclaimed by international declarations,
covenants, conventions and accords.
SpeCifically, Article 13 of the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
Article 12 of the 1966 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Article 5 of the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrmination and the Final Act
of The Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (1975 Helsinki
Accord) enshrine the right of emigration
within the parameters of international
law.
The Constitution of the U.S.S.R.
guarantees the same rights found in the
international documents, supra. Article
124 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.,
states: "In order to guarantee to citizens
freedom of conscience, the church in the
U.S.S.R. shall be separated from the state,
and the school from the church. Freedom
of religious worship and freedom of antireligious propaganda shall be recognized
for all citizens." In addition, Article 123
of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. states,
"Equality of rights of citizens of the
U.S.S.R., regardless of their nationality or
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race, in all spheres of economic, state,
cultural and SOCial-political life shall be
an indefeasible law."
International law and the municipal law
of the Soviet Union afford Soviet Jews, as
well as any other citizen, the right to
freely observe their chosen religion. Yet,
in application, these laws have taken a
Kafkaesque twist, with the Soviet Jew
caught in the middle. The Soviet Jew has
become the pawn of a super-power and
only recently has the "game" been documented by western correspondents. These
news articles are now redundant in their
narratives of Soviet Jews being jailed,
Soviet Jews being sent to mental hospitals, Soviet Jews being denied the sacraments of their religion, Soviet Jews being
denied permission to emigrate from the
Soviet Union, Soviet Jews being handicapped by quota systems in higher
education. The Soviet Union denies all its
citizens many basic human rights taken
for granted in the West, but the Jews are
treated worse than most. Despite its
slogans about equality, communism has
always been ambivalent on the Semitic
question.
Prior to discussing the import of international law on the right to emigrate, it is
imperative to review the Soviet perspective on international law. Soviet jurists
give narrower scope to the sources and
subjects of international law than most
Western authorities. Consequently, an examination of the obligations which the
Soviets themselves accept is limited by
this narrower outlook. Of the two primary
sources of international law recognized by
the Soviets-international treaties and international customs-the former is considered paramount. The Soviets stress inter-state negotiation leading to positive
agreements as the basic source of law
governing international relations.
Nevertheless, a recent trend in Soviet
public international law has been to accept certain decisions and resolutions of
international organizations as a source of
international law if they receive general
international recognition. Whereas the
Soviets recognize states, individuals and
juridical persons as the subjects of municipal law, they take the position that states
are the only subjects of international law.

Soviet spokesmen have repeatedly stated
that the individual cannot be a subject of
international law. Professor Novchan, a
Soviet legal scholar, states that, "The
theory that the individual is a subject of
international law is incompatible with the
nature of international law as interstate
law and has very few supporters among
international jurists. The exponents of
such a cosmopolitan interpretation of
human rights in essence completely
negate the sovereignty of states and in
fact, negate international law by replacing
it with 'human right.' "
Soviet Jews requesting permission to
emigrate to Israel insist that their claim
raises a right of repatriation. They point
to the establishment of Israel as a Jewish
state and repeatedly refer to it as their
country and the homeland of the Jewish
people. A prerequisite to an application
for an exit visa is an invitation from a relative abroad, and every Soviet Jew who
has applied to emigrate to Israel has relatives there. The Soviet Government itself
has recognized Israel as the homeland of
the Jewish people.
On December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly passed the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(Universal Declaration) as a "common
standard of achievement for all peoples
and all nations." Article 13(2) of the
Universal Declaration states: "Every person has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." Although initially not binding under
international law, since its adoption the
Declaration has received widespread
recognition and has taken on increased
significance. The General Assembly, in
two other resolutions, has declared the
Universal Declaration to be binding. The
view that the adoption of a resolution of
an international organization on a question of abstract legal principles constitutes

The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, passed unanimously
by the General Assembly on December
16, 1966, is a treaty which guarantees the
right of emigration. Article 12 of the
Covenant states, in part:
(2) Everyone shall be free to leave any
country including his own.
(3) The above mentioned rights shall
not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law,
necessary to protect national security,
public order, public health or morals or
the rights and freedoms of others, and
are consistent with the other rights
recognized in this Covenant.
(4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived
of the right to enter his own country.
The Soviets claim that their legislation
and rules of departure are in full accord
with the Covenant. When the Soviets
have not acted in accordance with the
bare requirements of Article 12 (2) of the
Covenant, they rely on the exceptions
contained in Article 12 (3) to justify their
actions. National security has been the
most frequent reason given by the Soviets
for denying exit visas. The question of national security is very much apposite to
many cases of the so-called Jewish
"refuseniks" (term applied to Jews who

U Thant called the Universal Declaration the "Magna Carta of Mankind." It is

have been refused an exit visa) in the
U.S.S.R., who have been denied the right
to emigrate owing to alleged previous access to State secrets. There probably are
instances in which the Soviet government

far more than a mere moral manifesto.
The Universal Declaration is, by custom,
becoming recognized as an expression of
rules binding upon states.

is genuinely and legitimately concerned
about the possibility of security leaks as a
result of emigration. The problems arise,
however, from indiscriminate, and at

important evidence of international law
has gained increasing support.

times bizarre, application of this control
device. The trouble is that there is no provision in the Soviet internal legal system
clarifying the boundaries which encompass national sec uri ty. If the clause
regarding "national security" is not given
a narrow interpretation, the effect could
be to deny or dilute the right of emigration. To guard against use of these exceptions for arbitrary purposes, the standard
suggested by Judge Ingles of the Philippines could be applied. In a thorough
study of the right of the individual to
leave any country and return to his own,
Judge Ingles recommehded that the use of
the public order and national security exceptions be restricted to instances in
which there is a "clear and pressing
danger of injury."
The official Soviet policy on this matter
is to detain a national who has had access
to classified information for a period of
one to five years. In practice, however,
Soviet Jews have been denied permiSSion
to emigrate after such periods have expired. Until reasonable guidelines for the
classifying of those subject to a "national
security" label are established and
followed by the Soviets, the denial of
emigration rights to persons classified
with this restrictive label is not justifiable.
There is a powerful case to be made out
that the Covenant is indicative of rights
long since accepted as binding under
general international law and that the
Covenant binds States directly by virtue
of its international legal status. International law thus recognizes, in the formulation of Article 12 of the Covenant, a right
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to emigrate. The Soviet Union has at no
stage indicated that it does not regard the
clause as a correct statement of the requirements of international law or that it
does not feel bound by the Covenant (in
fact the Soviets ratified the Covenant on
October 16, 1973). Indeed, the Soviet
argument is that such a right is fully
recognized by Soviet law. The argument,
then, is not about the validity of this norm
of international law, but about its application in fact in the Soviet Union. Since the
right is subject to certain reasonable controls of the State, only the criterion of
good faith can indicate whether the controls are being applied for their legitimate
purposes.
In additcon to the Universal Declaration and the Covenant, there is the International Convention on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination. Article 5(d) (ii) of
the Convention states that "the right to
leave any country, including one's own,
and to return to one's country" is guaranteed. The Soviet Union ratified this Convention and is legally bound by its provisions. Yet despite evidence of Soviet violations of the Convention, there appears
to be no effective international remedy
available to those individuals affected by
the Soviet policy. Although the Convention provides for the establishment of a
Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, its power is persuasive
rather than coercive. It is directed to report annually to the General Assembly
and make recommendations based on reports received from state parties. Only
such parties may bring allegedly infringing actions of other states before the
Committee. Communications from individuals may be received only if the party charged has agreed to recognize the
competence of the Committee on such
matters, but this provision will not take
effect until ten states have assented to
such jurisdiction. Even though the
possibility exists that another state party
may raise the issue of Soviet discrimination against Jews, the U.S.S.R. will not
recognize the Committee's jurisdiction
over complaints originated by individuals.
Moreover, the fact that enforcement provisions are limited to recommendations to
the General Assembly underscores the
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purely advisory nature of the Committee's
power.
It should be noted that the Universal
Declaration and the Covenant are no
different from the Convention on the issue
of enforcement. The advisory nature of
these documents lend to their being
classified as "paper tigers". Perhaps the
most profound international statement on
human rights in the twentieth century is
the Helsinki accord. Signed on August 1,
1975 by thirty-five nations, the Accord
recognized the fundamental principles,
among them Principle VII: "respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms,
including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief."
The human rights principle, which
represented the West's demand in exchange for recognizing post World War II
boundaries in Europe, is specified in concrete terms in "Basket III" (the accord is
divided into what has become commonly
referred to as three "Baskets" -military
security, economic cooperation and
humanitarian cooperation) of the Accord.
The Helsinki Accord was a coveted
Soviet project for some twenty years prior
to its conclusion in 1975. The Soviet
Union long had sought Western recognition of its postwar pOSition in Eastern
Europe through some statement concerning the inviolability of frontiers. It is
"Basket III", and in particular the human
contacts and information texts, that were
of greatest interest to the West and may
have the most influence on future events.
But the media colored the event as a dangerous concession by the West. The
general conclusion was that the President
had demeaned himself by recognizing
Soviet postwar domination in Eastern
Europe without any substantial quid pro
quo. George Ball was more vehement,
calling it "a defeat for the West."
Although the Helsinki Accord has
caused a flurry of criticism, it is only a

as consistent with international law, and,
given the level at which it was concluded,
many observers think it may become in
fact one of the most widely quoted
sources of customary international law.
On October 4, 1977 the thirty-five signatories to the Helsinki Accord met in
Belgrade, Yugoslavia to review the Accord. The conference was convened to
check how the signatory nations have
complied with the agreement reached in
Helsinki. Before the meeting began, there
were fears that it would become a bitter
political wrangle between the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R. over human rights. Arthur
Goldberg, the Chief U.S. delegate,
opened his remarks to the conference by
reading off a list of human rights violations but named no names or countries. It
appears as if both superpowers are attempting to prevent any diplomatic
chasms. Although the diplomats at
Belgrade are behaving diplomatically, the
start of the conference ignited demonstrations and appeals to the West by Soviet
Jewish dissidents.
Since the Belgrade Conference is still in
session, as this article goes to press, the
outcome is unknown. Taking the risk
which faces anyone who makes an educated guess, I believe the Belgrade conference may create a few national bruises
but lead to no blood letting. The superpowers will vocalize their disappointment
at "Basket III" violations, but immediate
rectification will not occur. Yet, the document will be a relentless diplomatic problem for the Soviets for many years to
come. A ray of hope emanates from the
mere fact that the U.S.S.R. even accepted
a separate principle on human rights at
Helsinki. Thus, the Soviets having
acknowledged the desireability of "Basket
III" concepts in one of their favorite international documents succeeded in focusing
world attention on their observance of the

moral commitment and not legally binding. For this reason, the conference docu-

Accord.
All Soviet citizens, not just Jews, suffer
from the Soviet Government's policy of

ment was cast in the form of a "Final
Act" (in international practice a "Final
Act" is not normally a legal instrument).
The Helsinki Accord, then, is not a legal
document and does not purport to state
international law. It is viewed, however,

militant atheism and its refusal to consider emigration as a right rather than a
rare privilege, as well as from other
restrictions. But the limitations on Jews
have in many important respects been
more stringent. This is chiefly because

Jews appear to be suspect in a special
way-many have kin abroad in Israel, the
United States, and Western Europe, and
"Jewishness" in the Soviet Union has
come to be regarded by a certain segment
of Soviet officialdom as a more alien
phenomenon than the fact of association
with other major religious or national
cultures in the U.S.S.R The Soviet
regime has viewed the relationship between Soviet Jews and world Jewry with
an anxiety bordering on political
paranoia. A basic assumption is that the
Soviets care about responsible public
opinion abroad. In this sense the aforementioned international documents lay
the cornerstone for world public opinion
to build upon.
On June 15, 1970, a group of Soviet
Jews were arrested in Leningrad for conspiring to hijack an airplane. Charged
with attempted treason, they were condemned to death. The Supreme Court of
the RS.F.S.R commuted the sentences to
fifteen years. These "Leningrad Hijacking
Trials" prompted a distinguished group of
American attorneys-Alan Dershowitz,
George Fletcher, Eugene Gold, Leon Lipson, Melvin Stein, Telford Taylor, and
Nicholas Scoppetta-to form the American Legal Defense Project in order to
challenge the validity of the Soviet criminal proceedings. These American lawyers
filed petitions for the defendants in the
"Leningrad Hijacking Trials". The Procurator General of the U.S.S.R denied the
relief requested by the American lawyers.
Reflecting on this unique legal experience, Telford Taylor stated, "The
reason why the trials were conducted as
they were was exemplary. It was State
policy to discourage Jewish emigration
without appearing to prohibit it. Loss of
jobs, apartments, and other privileges or
necessities of Soviet life discouraged
some, but by no means all, would be
emigrants. Use of the criminal law was
another and more drastic means to the
same end."
The past and recent events surrounding
the plight of Jews within the Soviet Union
brings us to a frequently asked question.
Why doesn't the Soviet Union allow them
to emigrate to Israel or elsewhere; why
doesn't it encourage Jewish emigration?

The answer to this question is complex
and involves a myriad of ideological principles which affect the socio-political
fabric of the Soviet Union.
For fundamental ideological reasons,
the Soviet Union is closed and forbids
emigration. The underlying premise is
that the Soviet Union, which was the first
to achieve communism, is the most advanced country in the history of manand all its peoples are content. Is it conceivable, therefore, that large numbers of
citizens within such an ideal society
should be unsatisfied with their lives and
ungrateful for their destiny? Why, then,
should anyone wish to emigrate?
But besides the ideological reason is a
practical one as well. Despite their lack of
sympathy for the Jews as a national
group, the Soviet authorities are aware
that the Jews are an important component
of the Soviet economy. Jews serve as
engineers, doctors, teachers, scientists,
and artists. Take the Jews out of the
Soviet mainstream and economic repercussions will be felt.
Another rationale for the Soviet
Union's reluctance to allow mass emigration for its Jewish population is imbedded
in the diplomacy of detente. Detente, by
its very nature, calls for nation-states to
partake in an international give and take.
Any state involved in detente must be
resigned to the fact that certain concessions must be made in order to gain their
own goals. The Soviet Jews have been entangled within this international juggling
act. Soviet Jews serve as an integral
bargaining element for the Soviet Union
when they sit down with their Western
counterparts. The emigration figures for
Soviet Jews reflect the periods of relaxed
Eest-West relations as well as the periods
of polarized relations. Thus, the West
must take steps, such as economic retaliation, to afford themselves parity with the
Soviets on this issue. But the fact remains
that detente is a delicate process in which
gradual reform, rather than instant results,
is the order of the day.
Neither detente, international law,
world public opinion, nor rataliation have
proven to be a "wonder drug" for the
Soviet Jews attempting to emigrate. Yet,
they all serve a useful purpose in the pro-

cess of eroding the Soviet policy which
has been predominant for decades. They
also serve the purpose of reaching a solution by peace. The chill from the Cold
War period still lingers in East-West relations, and influences the delicate decisions presently made by the Superpowers.
Therefore, only national and well
thought out plans should be utilized in
aiding the Jews in the Soviet Union. This
is not to imply that the voice of the world
should be toned down, nor that the West
should not be relentless in bringing the
Soviets to the bargaining table. The major
import of this caveat is to highlight the
razor's edge which exists between
peaceful co-existence and polarity in EastWest relations.
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